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 The process of transition to market economy
in Russia follows a rugged path. Harmful
regulation is prevalent and production subsi-
dies still amount to almost 7 percent of GNP
– the highest in any post communist country.1
Especially subsidies to energy and agricultural
production continue to be heavy burdens for
Russian taxpayers, and the fact that some nec-
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The article analyzes the causes of the incoherent reformprogram in Russia in the last decade.
It argues that the slow and partial policies can be attributed to a viscous combination of
lobbyism and constitutional design. Because the post-communist transitions after 1989
were non-violent “velvet revolutions,” the old state monopolies were not removed. State
monopolies have small-group advantages in contrast to the large group of private firms,
which are numerous and not yet organized. It leads to an asymmetrical pattern of lobbyism
in favor of non-transition, which can only be mitigated by establishing dispersed political
institutions, that can raise the price on rent-seeking. In Russia the centralized political
institutions of the past were not replaced. Hence, Russia inherited both interest groups and
political institutions of the late communist era – an unfortunate starting point for carrying
out comprehensive economic reforms. Free trade with the West and potential competition
may put pressure on the old state monopolies. However, lobbies in the European Union
may oppose free trade to maintain their monopoly. JEL codes: B0, D7, P0
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have been taken, cannot remove the image of
a slow and uneven reform process.
But why does Russia find it so hard to cap-
ture the gains from a coherent reform pro-
gram? Unfortunately, this question has not
been convincingly answered in the social
science literature. One of the main problems
is the reliance on narrow disciplinary
approaches. In economics, the dominating
neoclassical paradigm has proved to be of lit-
tle relevance. In the full-information world of
neoclassical theory, welfare gains can be real-
ized at no costs. Hence, economist have had
much to say about optimal policies, but little
about why they are not implemented.2 At the
same time, political scientists relying on the
traditional behavioralistic approach have
found it difficult to account for the existence
of slow and incoherent reform policies in
Russia. Usually, studies within this reasearch
tradition conclude that the country’s authori-
tarian political culture precludes all liberal
tendencies in both the political and econom-
ic sphere. Needless to say, such explanations
are too deterministic.3
Instead of relying on narrow approaches,
we believe that the study of post communist
transitions would benefit from paying atten-
tion to some of the studies within the new in-
terdisciplinary research tradition of positive
political economy. First, lessons from public
choice studies by Mancur Olson, tell us that
the ability of interest groups to affect public
policy is affected by their ability to act as small
groups. Second, lessons from North and
Weingast’s studies of the economics of insti-
tutions tell us that results from such lobbying
may be reinforced, or mitigated, by the struc-
ture of political institutions.
Our contribution is to combine the in-
sights from these studies and thereby shed
new light on the drastic and unanticipated
economic slow-down in Russia. By introduc-
ing a simple theoretical model, the aim is to
explain the dominance of incoherent reform
policies and to recommend how these impor-
tant barriers to economic growth can be elim-
inated. Essentially, we will argue that policy
solutions can be attributed to a viscious com-
bination of interest group formation and
political institutions, which both are products
of Russia’s non-violent ‘velvet revolution’. 
The outline is the following. First, we will
introduce the basic assumptions of the re-
search tradition of positive political economy.
Second, we will introduce Mancur Olsons
theory of interest groups, and develop a
hypothesis about interest group behavior
when moving from centrally planned to mar-
ket economy. Third, the theory of political
institutions as governance structures is pre-
sented, and a hypothesis about the relations
between political institutions and lobbying in
post communist countries, developed.
Fourth, we will analyze the interaction be-
tween interests groups, political institutions
and policy outcomes in Russia since 1991. Fi-
nally, a conclusion will be drawn and policy
recommendations and perspectives presented. 
Positive Political Economy
Positive political economy is essentially ‘the
study of rational decisions in the context of
political and economic institutions’.4 Even
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2.  See Murell (1991) for a discussion of the limits of the neoclassical theory in explaining performance in former-
ly centrally planned economies.
3.  Zimmerman (1995) offers a thoughtful discussion of the problems of determinism in studies of political cul-
ture in Russia. 
4.  Alt and Shepsle (1990:2).
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neoclassical theory, it is grounded in the ra-
tional actor methodology of microeconomics.
It assumes that both political and economic
actors act optimally towards well specified
utility functions, while at the same time being
constrained by the institutions established to
structure their interaction.
The assumption about human behavior is,
as such, harsh and simple: man will pursue
private interests and not those of the public or
the common interest. While market agents
seek to maximize income in monetary terms,
politicians will tend to maximize tenure and
political influence. Therefore, utility func-
tions may vary according to ones position, but
it is assumed that everybody, irrespective of
position, acts optimally towards his well-spec-
ified preferences. 
Even though these basic assumptions are
the foundation for every study within the
positive political economy discipline, the
studies often emphasize different aspects of
human interaction. Olson’s studies of interest
groups mainly focus on how interest groups
endowed with different resources may affect
policy outcomes, while North and Weingast’s
study of constitutions, on the contrary, main-
ly concentrate on how policy outcomes are
constrained by political institutions.
These different perspectives are not mutu-
ally exclusive. In fact, we believe that it is when
the perspectives are combined and integrated,
that the positive political economy framework
is best suited to analyze policy outcomes.
Olson provides an understanding of how
rational interest groups endowed with differ-
ent resources and interests lobby for favorable
regulation, while North and Weingast provide
an understanding of how their lobbyism is
affected by the structure of political institu-
tions. Hence, by combining the two we get a
coherent framework for analyzing ‘rational’
public policy decisions in the context of
political institutions. Figure 1 illustrates this
logic.
As the model in Figure 1 indicates, the
political institutions are themselves designed
under the influence of interest groups. This
relation is not clear-cut, as interest groups
rarely on their own determime the constitu-
tional design. They can influence the design
by lobbying for a set of political institutions,
but they can still be overridden by a majority
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Figure 1.
An integrated positive political economy perspective on interest groups, political
institutions and  polic
interest group formation                  pattern of lobbyism                                                         policy
political institutions
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more or less ignorant about politics.5 Hence,
the success of political institutions to mitigate
the pressures from narrow interest groups is
dependent upon voter’s ability to prevent those
groups from designing the constitution.6
Furthermore, the model includes the dis-
tributive consequences of policies, which
feedback to the formation of interest groups.
It implies a certain inertia and that the polit-
ical process reproduces itself. 
Now, who are the interest groups who will
try to influence public policy in Russia, how
are their lobby activities constrained by the
rules of the political game, and how are poli-
cy outcomes affected by these processes? We
will start our investigation by introducing
some lessons from the public choice theore-
tical literature on interest group behavior.
Interest groups, lobbyism and
transition
In Eastern Europe, the new markets are only
added to what is left of the old system of state
monopolies. These public enterprises were the
dominant interest groups in earlier commu-
nist regimes and got their privileges at that
time. Because the transition to democracy in
1989 were non-violent “velvet revolutions”,
the state monopolies were not removed.
Rather  – as economically rational interest
groups – they will now try to preserve the
existing redistributional system and block
economic growth.
This thought of line follows from Mancur
Olson’s books, The Rise and Decline of Nations
(1982) and Power and Prosperity (2000).
Olson argues that more and more interest
groups are assumed to develop over time and
by coincidence. Because these organizations
tend to persist, older democracies will be filled
with a greater number of groups resulting in
increasing pressures for redistribution. Con-
sequently, the oldest democracy, Great
Britain, experienced economic stagnation
after World War II because of the burden of
groups, the so-called “British Disease”. This
in stark contrast to Germany and Japan which
experienced economic miracles after World
War II, due to the absence of groups at that
time. When a totalitarian government, a rev-
olution, or a total defeat in war destroys the
institutional fabric of a society, then that
society will grow rapidly when a stable legal
order is established, if there is no significant
redistribution to prevent optimal invest-
ments.
Olson argues that this was exactly the case
in England/ Great Britain when the country
rose to power from the end of the seventeenth
century. In 1688-89, the so-called Glorious
revolution swept across country and effective-
ly put an end to the long and devastating
period of civil war. A revolutionary settle-
ment, which introduced new and more
democratic political institutions, was drafted.
Because the king had been severely weakened
by the long lasting powerstruggles, he had to
accept to divide powers with a new elected
parliament, which represented wealthy males
across the country. As Olson concludes, it was
England’s  ‘luck’ that it had experienced a
violent civil war and revolution. Not only had
the country become more democratic, but
most important, the special interest groups
that previously had been involved in subopti-
mal redistribution of the national income had
184 Esben Bergmann Schjødt and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
5.  Downs (1957) indicates how it is rational for the single voter to stay ignorant about public affairs because his
vote is not likely to affect the outcome of a typical election. See also Svendsen (1998a).
6. See  Nørgaard (2000) for discussion of this problem. 
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were unable to be successful in their tradi-
tional lobbying for wealth redistribution. As a
result, public spending was increasingly allo-
cated to productive uses. That gave rise to op-
timal investments and prosperity, which last-
ed until new groups, hundreds of years later,
were able to engage in redistribution and cre-
ate the ‘British disease’.7
According to Olson, such redistribution
takes place because rational groups will try to
steal as much money as possible from e.g. the
treasury and redistribute as much as possible
from the taxpayers to itself. For example, a
farmer lobby or a state monopoly may repre-
sent 1% of the national income. It follows that
the group will only stop redistributing to its
clients when the reduction in national income
is a 100 times as great as the amount they win
in the redistributional struggle. In contrast, if
the interest group tries to change policies for
the better, the group will only receive 1% of
the benefits, but will bear all the costs.8 This
kind of lobbyism will tend to result in redis-
tribution from the taxpayers to special inter-
est groups.
More precisely, the advantage, Ai that any
individual  i would get from receiving any
amount of the collective good would be the
return or “value”, Vi , to the individual i mi-
nus the total cost of providing the collective
good, C, so that Ai= Vi- C. If Aiis clearly pos-
itive, the group is small and the collective
good will be provided; if Ai is approximately
zero, the group is intermediate; and if Ai is
clearly negative, the group is large.9That is to
say, the more negative Ai is, the more likely it
is that the group will fail. The larger the group
is, the less is the extra value to an individual
from his individual investment or costs. 
The Eastern European version of the
“British Disease” can be illustrated by the use
of this theory. Let us consider the potential
“winners” from (i) transition and (ii) non-
transition to market economy. The collective
good of transition or non-transition to mar-
ket economy is provided by lobbyism. The re-
sults from this analysis lead to a hypothesis on
rational interest group behavior in Eastern
Europe and an asymmetrical political pressure
against market economy (iii).
i) Economic “winners” from transition to
market economy
Say, that 1 million private firms exist in an
Eastern European country. These numerous
and small firms are not organized yet in a large
group but they will all be potential economic
“winners” by the collective good provision. In
the case of open markets, talented entrepre-
neurs from the East would conquer market
shares from its own state monopolies and
from EU firms and farmers.
Assume furthermore, that the individual
economic reward in the first year, Vi, is $1000
from private enterprise. The total costs of pro-
viding the good, C, is $100 million which is
used for lobbying politicians to provide the
collective good, Qi, of full transition to mar-
ket economy. 
This case of a large group is shown in
Figure 2. The individual demand curve for the
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7.  Olson (2000: 98).
8.  Olson (1991:140). Most redistributions are from unorganized groups to organized groups. When nations sub-
sidize the non-poor, they channel the time and energies of some of their most productive people and assets into
less productive pursuits and thereby reduce social efficiency. For example, tax loopholes induce much of the pro-
ductive capacity of the society to move into tax-favored activities (Olson 1991:146).
9. Olson  (1965:23).
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curve for producing any amount of Q at the
price of Pi , is depicted as S.
In this case of a large group, no single
member will provide the good without orga-
nization; his advantage or net gain is clearly
negative. The total costs, C, is much higher
than the individual gain, Vi , below the Di
curve. The net benefit to the individual, Ai, is
clearly negative.
ii) Economic “winners” from non-
transition to market economy
In contrast, the “winners” from preventing a
transition to market economy are few. The in-
effective state monopolies would soon be
eliminated in competition with private firms.
Assume, that there are 5 state monopolies
and that they will lose profits corresponding
to the total gain for all the private firms, that
is $1 billion ($1,000 times 1 million) or a
$200 million gain for each monopoly. Simi-
larly, it will cost the monopolies $100 million
in total to lobby against the market economy
and thereby try to preserve their state mo-
nopolies.
Figure 3 shows that in this case it is prof-
itable for the individual monopoly to lobby
on its own for preventing market economy.
One monopoly will on its own earn a net gain
Ai ($100 million) by producing the amount
Qi at the cost C of $100 million.10
iii) Asymmetrical political pressure against
market economy
The theory above hypothesizes that an asym-
metrical political pressure against the transi-
tion to market economy will occur in Eastern
Europe. Each of the 5 state monopolies would
have a strong economic incentive to provide
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Figure 2.
“Winners” from transition: Large group
Figure 3.
“Winners” from non-transition: Small group
10. If the 5 monopolies agree on sharing the lobby costs, each of them must only pay $20 million. The individual
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own and earn a clear $100 million. Therefore
this small group with only a few members will
oppose the transition to market economy even
in the absence of organization.
In contrast, none of the private firm own-
ers will lobby for transition on their own. Be-
cause each of them would gain only $1,000
and would then have to pay all the costs of
$100 million for lobbyism. Even though the
group as a whole would receive ten times the
money invested by collective action ($1 bil-
lion in total gain vs. $100 million in total
cost), it will not provide the good because this
group is not organized. Therefore this large,
non-organized group will not promote the
transition to market economy. 
So, based on Olson, we hypothesize that
the few state monopolies are in a strong posi-
tion to win the economic struggle in the
political arena and prevent transition to
market economy. 
Political institutions, lobbyism and
transition
Under what circumstances do we expect or-
ganized interest groups to be successful in
their lobbying? According to institutional
economists like Douglass North and Barry
Weingast, the ability to acquire favorable reg-
ulation, is strictly related to the formation of
political institutions - understood as ‘the rules
defining the hierarchical structure of the poli-
ty, its basic decision structure and the explic-
it characteristics of agenda control.’11
Their argument is also illustrated with ref-
erence to the development in England after
the civil war in the seventeenth century. Con-
trary to Olson, who emphasizes the role of
interest groups in his study of British pros-
perity and decline, North and Weingast
attributes the rise of England mainly to the
constitutional change following the Glorious
revolution in 1688-89. For North and Wein-
gast, the most important feature of the revo-
lution was the way political power was divid-
ed. The revolutionary settlement stated that
the parliament gained the upper hand in
financial matters. Hence, parliament acquired
the power to raise new taxes and the rights to
monitor and veto spending by the king. On
the other hand, only the king could propose
an expenditure, which parliament again had
to authorize. The outcome was a complex
institutional arrangement of checks and
balances in which the parliament became the
new locus of power, but where the crown still
held significant political power.12
According to North and Weingast, the
new constitutional arrangement had an inde-
pendent (positive) impact on public policy.
First, private property rights became more se-
cure than under the Stuart kings. The rights
that the state granted to private agents were
now more difficult to renege on, as more ac-
tors had to accept such renegation. Second,
power sharing and parliamentary supremacy,
mitigated rent-seeking activities, by raising
the price of favorable regulation. Interest
group seeking private benefits now had to deal
with both the king and the parliament, which
in itself consisted of several actors. Hence,
North and Weingast conclude that the insti-
tutional arrangement ‘significantly limited
publicly supplied private benefits’.13By estab-
lishing rules that increased the number of
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rendered rent-seeking activities more diffi-
cult. Not only were private interest groups
weakened by violent conflict, as Olson
suggests – they also had to pay a higher price
for favorable regulation than they previously
paid under the centralized political system of
the Stuarts. 
How does this logic relate to countries
undergoing the transition from centrally
planned to market economy? The lessons
from North and Weingast’s study suggest that
the political institutions devised during the
exit from the old system are crucial for
performance afterwards. Likewise, we would
expect the design of political institutions to be
crucial for economic reforms in Eastern
Europe. Harmful lobbyism from the groups
surviving the breakdown of state socialism
may very well be mitigated if new power
sharing arrangements are established. On the
contrary, smooth institutional adjustment,
where no political veto players are installed,
may lower the price of rent seeking.
It is important to note, in this respect, that
establishing democracy is not necessarily
enough. Even though democracy tends to
mitigate pressures from narrow interest
groups, democratic constitutions vary in their
ability to raise the price on favorable regula-
tion. To illustrate this, think of either a
democratic super-presidentialist system or a
parliamentary one-party system. In each case
the price on special regulation tends to be
lower than in a political system in which a
multiparty parliament shares political power
with a popular elected president.14 
So, based on North and Weingast, we
hypothesize that narrow interest groups will
find it easier to influence economic policy
when the post communist political institu-
tions are centralized and without a plurality of
political veto players.
Russia
In this section we will analyze how our simple
integrated model relate to the Russian case.
We begin our analysis with an assessment of
the formation of interest groups when transi-
tion started. First of all: which groups were
capable of acting as small groups immediate-
ly after the breakdown of the Soviet Union?
Interest group formation
A very robust finding is that the new private
firms, established under the period of eco-
nomic restructuring (perestroika) were not
strong lobbies. They were not organized yet,
were numerous and small and they couldn’t
act as a small group in any sector.15
With respect to traditional interest groups,
Åslund (1995) lists four dominant state
monopolies from the Soviet era: The military-
industrial complex (VPK), the foreign trade
establishment, the agrarian sector and the
energy sector. 
Even though the foreign trade sector
thrived on the subsidized prices in the Soviet
Union, it did not itself establish these favorable
domestic policies by lobbying as a small group.
In fact, the “cross-trading” option itself may be
viewed as an unintended result of opening up
trade in relation to Western Europe. This hap-
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14. See Tsebelis (1995) for a discussion of how to count political vetoplayers.
15. As Åslund (1995:308) laconically puts it, the focus here is on profit seeking rather than rent seeking. It will
probably take a significant amount of time before the new, private enterprises overcome the problems of getting
organized against the old state monopolies. Favorable circumstances and the right leadership only occur
occasionally, see Olson (1982) and Svendsen (1998a). See also Paldam and Svendsen (2000; 2001) concerning
entrepreneurship, corruption and the level of social capital in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.
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started getting desperate to stop economic de-
cline and to reduce the technology gap with the
West.16 Again, as in the case of the new private
firms, the foreign trade sector was not strongly
organized and was characterized by numerous
small traders. It couldn’t, therefore, act as a
small group.
Likewise,  Åslund (1995) finds that the
military lobby wasn’t able to act as a small
group. On the surface, this is a puzzling find-
ing since the VPK traditionally was perceived
as the strongest lobby in the Soviet Union. For
example, the VPK consumed one-quarter of
GDP in end of the Soviet era.17 However, Ås-
lund argues that the VPK lobby was weakened
severely by internal competition. Already un-
der the old regime, the Ministry of Defense
had, quite non-ideologically, insisted on hav-
ing several producers competing with one an-
other. The goal was to keep up with the West
in the arms race. For example, the half-dozen
Russian airplane manufacturers had to realize
that some would disappear and some survive.
Each enterprise on its own competed in de-
sign, technology, and quality with several oth-
ers. Therefore, there was no reason to collab-
orate and act as a small group.18
In contrast, the producers in the energy
and the agrian sectors were never competing
on the quality of their products. When pro-
ducing the same products, such as grain and
energy, the producers only compete over
price. Because the state set all official prices in
the Soviet Union, they could not even com-
pete over price. Instead, they could act as small
groups and lobby to get as many resources and
subsidies as possible.19
These findings suggest that an asymmetri-
cal process of lobbyism emerged at the time
the Soviet Union fell apart. In any sector new
private firms were weakly organized, while es-
pecially two of the traditional key industries
were capable of promoting non-transition .
The structure of political institutions
Now, what were the political institutional
conditions for rent seeking in Russia at that
time? To answer this question, we briefly have
to consider the circumstances under which
Russia left the Soviet Union. 
In Russia, the breakdown of the Soviet
Union resulted in a very complicated consti-
tutional situation. The main problem was that
many Russians never really considered the
breakdown before it actually happened in De-
cember 1991. The reason was that Russia for
seven decades had dominated the Soviet
Union. Therefore, even though a large major-
ity of Russians were tired of communism, not
everybody disliked the idea of a union they
could dominate. Because Russian indepen-
dence, unlike for instance Baltic indepen-
dence, was never really an issue prior to the
breakdown, no new Russian constitution was
seriously considered and no new political in-
stitutions devised ex ante.20
Because of the lack of a genuine democra-
tic revolt, Russia had to do with the institu-
tions left over by the Soviet Union. Conse-
quently, the constitution from 1977, includ-
ing amendments, still applied. One important
amendment was the introduction of a Russ-
ian president who, from November 1991,
possessed almost dictatorial powers. The only
check and balance in this super-presidential-
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ratic Congress of Peoples Deputies which had
been elected in semi free elections in March
1990 as a part of Gorbachev’s democratization
of Soviet political life.21
Bargaining and policy outcomes
If we recall the lessons from the theoretical
literature presented, seventeenth century
England prospered due to a virtuous combi-
nation of weak interest groups and divided
political institutions which had positive con-
sequences for the formulation of economic
policy. In many ways, the development in
Post-Soviet Russia resembles this logic. The
only difference is simply that England repre-
sents the positive version of the story, while
Russia represents the negative version. This
becomes clear when we evaluate the develop-
ment following the breakdown of the Soviet
Union in late 1991.
Initially, Yeltsin started out with an opti-
mistic and liberal economic policy in January
1992. With assistance from well-known econ-
omists like Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Åslund,
a comprehensive plan was launched on
January 2. Prices ceilings were eliminated,
foreign trade liberalized and subsidies cut
almost over night. Unfortunately, he was an
easy prey for the best-organized interest
groups that survived the non-violent break-
down of the Soviet Union. 
During 1992, massive protests forced him
to rethink his strategies. In December, the
more conservative industrialist Victor Cher-
nomyrdin replaced the liberal Prime Minister
Yegor Gajdar. This very appointment signaled
that Yeltsin, as the locus of power, effectively
had been captured by the groups, who
managed to act like like small groups: Cher-
nomyrdin was chairman of Gazprom, by far
the biggest energy company in Russia!22
Chernomyrdin and his discrete agrarian
supporters soon engaged in redistribution on
expense of the groups not properly organized.
Consequently, the military lobby received
only a minimum of state orders and subsidies
so that production of military goods fell by
68% from 1991 to 1993. The foreign trade
lobby effectively lost its “cross-trading” profits
when foreign trade was liberalized in January
1992, and were not able to re-establish their
monopoly rents at any time during the
Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin reign.23 In contrast,
the energy and agrarian lobbies maintained
their privileges. The energy lobby (gas, oil and
coal lobbies) remained subsidized and
exempted from virtually all taxes. In 1993,
coal and gas prices in Russia were as low as 4%
of world market prices.24 Likewise, the
agrarian lobby received about half of the
subsidized credits and the most of the budget
subsidies in 1993.
Generally speaking, the pace of private
sector reforms was slowed after the appoint-
ment of Chernomyrdin. Even though more
than 15,000 industrial enterprises were
privatized from 1992-94, these were mainly
‘pseudo’ privatisations, as effective corporate
governance was not established. Many priva-
tized firms were brought under control of
persons closely affiliated with the energy lob-
by, and especially Gazprom has converted
many unpaid gasbills into direct ownership.25
From this position, they have been able to
extract subsidies from the state, often in
190 Esben Bergmann Schjødt and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
21. White, Rose and McAllister (1997).
22. Sakwa (1997:238).
23. Åslund (1995:300).
24. Åslund (1995:300 and 303).
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workers trying to keep their jobs. 
The viscous combination of strong asym-
metrical lobbying and centralized political
institutions was subsequently buttressed by
the constitutional development from 1993. In
December 1993, Yeltsin, with support from
especially the energy lobby, won a constitu-
tional referendum that formalized the super-
presidential system. The traditional Russian
Duma was reinvented, but only to play a very
marginal role in policy formulation. The locus
of power continued to be effectively centered
around the president, and parliamentary
checks and balances did not develop. Hence,
the price of rent seeking continued to be very
low compared to other post-communist
countries, as for instance Poland and the
Czech Republic, where more effective and
democratic division of powers were estab-
lished to mitigate the pressures from the state
monopolies that survived the breakdown of
communism. 26 The chances of these lobbies
to be successful in their bid for redistribution
have been proportionally higher in Russia.
Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that the slow and
uneven process of transition in Russia can be
attributed to a combination of strong asym-
metrical lobbying and an unfavorable consti-
tutional framework. 
New private firms have had severe diffi-
culties in promoting transition due to the
inability to act as small groups capable of
effective lobbyism. On the contrary, energy
and agrarian state monopolies with strong
economic incentives to block transition were
able to act as small groups. Unfortunately, the
centralized political institutions inherited
from the past were not able to mitigate their
pressure. The presence of only one political
veto player made it easy for them to promote
redistribution that continues to crumble some
of Russia’s key industries. 
These lobbies have not met sufficient re-
sistance from ordinary citizens who pay for
the harmful subsidies. The Russian voters
favored the formalization of the very central-
ized presidential system in 1993. Therefore,
the price of rent seeking continues to be too
low, which is not conductive to the adoption
of more comprehensive reformpolicies. The
adoption of more dispersed political institu-
tions, like the institutions of post-revolution-
ary England, could have been an opportunity
to kick-start the battle against the rent seek-
ing of the surviving state monopolies. Unfor-
tunately, it turned out to be another missed
opportunity in Russian history. 
The few positive results are mainly deter-
mined by the inability of the foreign trade and
military lobbies to act as small groups. Hence,
Russia has eliminated both the foreign trade
monopoly and a good deal of the military
industrial complex. It does not, however, off-
set the welfare losses caused by the negative
elements of the Russian reform program.  
The interdisciplinary positive political
economy model has proven to be valuable in
the search for explanations to why Russia has
found it so difficult to capture the gains from
a coherent reform program. From this per-
spective, Russia’s rugged transition path and
the failure to emulate the English/ British mir-
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26. It is not finally settled whether there is a significant correlation between political institutional design and the
scope of economic reforms when including all post-communist states. Hellman (1996; 1998) and EBRD (1999)
all identify a strong positive relation between division of power and economic reforms, while Nørgaard on the
contrary, argues that the correlation disappears when controlled for initial socio-economic conditions (Nørgaard,
2000:141-2). 
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attributed to an unfortunate interplay be-
tween actors and the rules devises for political
interaction. Contrary to the Glorious revolu-
tion, Russia’s  ‘velvet revolution’ eliminated
neither interest groups, nor the centralized
political institutions of the past. No clean
breaks were made, as Russia inherited both the
actors and the constitution of the late com-
munist era. Consequently, the processes that
supported growth in seventeenth century
England, supported rent seeking and slow
transformation in Russia. These logics are
summarized in figure 4:
Recommendations and perspectives
The results listed above are mainly theoretical
suggestions, which can be more carefully op-
erationalized and empirically tested. Howev-
er, positive political economy sheds a fresh
perspective on the process of transition to
market economy in Eastern Europe.
To solve the problems of uneven and slow
transition is extremely difficult. As mentioned
above, the Russian voter’s who pay the in-
complete reform program, could have reacted
when they had the chance to open up the cen-
tralized system. Today they can mainly react
by replacing the president. Of course that is
192 Esben Bergmann Schjødt and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
weak interest groups              sporadic pressure for redistribution                             comprehensive 
reforms
division of powers with parliamentary supremacy
Figure 4.
England vs. Russia
strong/asymmetric interest groups             strong pressure for redistibution                    slow/partial 
reforms
centralization of powers with presidential supremacy
England and the Glorious revolution
Russia and the Velvet revolution
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the job, he continues to be an easy prey for the
groups, which are seeking to block transi-
tion.27It seems that the Russian voters have to
insist on a belated democratic revolution,
where the centralized institutions are replaced
by a genuine power sharing arrangement. Of
course the prospects of such an upheaval look
bleak as all the problems of collective action
apply.
What can the western world, and especial-
ly the EU, do? One obvious solution would
be to undercut the old state monopolies by
encouraging free trade. The EU must mobi-
lize its consumers and taxpayers and hasten to
open its markets to the East, especially the lu-
crative agricultural markets. 
So far, the EU has pursued a cynical and
protectionist trade policy towards Eastern Eu-
rope, especially with regard to agricultural
products.28The well-organized farmer lobbies
in the EU obviously fear the potential com-
petition from Eastern Europe. Farmer organi-
zations in the EU will oppose free trade to pre-
serve their monopoly. Historically, they have
acted as a successful cartel. Extensive lobby ef-
forts have resulted in minimum prices and
substantial redistribution to their group from
European taxpayers and consumers. Both tax-
payers and consumers within the EU would
gain from free trade but, being weakly orga-
nized large groups, they have easily been over-
run by the farmer organizations so far.29
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